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ABSTRACT
Digital forensic practitioners are tasked with the identification, recovery, and analysis of
Internet browser artefacts which may have been used in the pursuit of committing a civil
or criminal offence. This research paper critically compares the most downloaded browser,
Google Chrome, against an increasingly popular Chromium browser known as Brave, said to
offer privacy-by-default. With increasing forensic caseloads, data complexity, and requirements
for method validation to satisfy ISO 17025 accreditation, recognising the similarities and
differences between the browsers, developed on the same underlying technology is essential.
The paper describes a series of conducted experiments and subsequent analysis to identify
artefacts created as part of normal user browsing activity. Analysis of the artefacts found
that Brave and Chrome share almost identical data structures, with on-disk artefact recovery
successful, even for deleted data. The outcome of this research, based upon the results, serves
to enrich understanding and provide best practice for practitioners and software developers,
respectively responsible for examining Chromium artefacts for use in evidence production
and developing new forensic tools and techniques.
Keywords: Brave Browser, Browser Artefacts, Digital Forensics, Google Chrome

1.

INTRODUCTION

Chromium based web browsers, each designed with specific features and functionality to set themselves apart from one another,
presents an on-going technical challenge to
those tasked with conducting digital forensic
examinations. User privacy awareness continues to dominate the online world, with users
now much more conscious about what data
is collected and stored of their web browsing habits. This concern has seen the adoption of Brave Browser, built around the con© 2022 JDFSL

cept of privacy-by-default, grow in popularity.
Privacy features include ad-blocking, antitracking functionality and cryptocurrency offerings. Every new browser or integrated
feature can pose serious forensic implications
so research must be reviewed and updated
regularly.
Despite prior work conducted for the Brave
Browser, there is a lack of research relating
to what artefact can be recovered from the
disk when using the normal browsing mode,
where these artefacts are located, how they
are structured, and most importantly how
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they compare to those found when examining Google Chrome. The requirement to understand what evidence is available becomes
ever so more pertinent for ISO 17025 accredited digital forensic units, to have confidence
that forensic processes are repeatable and
validated, that results are accurate.
Whilst Chrome maintains the highest market share, Brave’s popularity is on the increase, driven by privacy-by-default functionality. User’s will typically look to transfer to browsers that look and act familiar
whilst providing new functionality they require. This coupled with the fast-changing
nature of browser development requires the
Digital Forensics community to continuously
re-examine and evaluate evidential implications. The purpose of this paper is to provide
a greater understanding of the similarities
and differences of analysing the latest Brave
artefacts against Google Chrome which is required by both forensic practitioners, tasked
with investigating civil and criminal cases,
as well as forensic software developers who
are tasked to automate processes for the extraction and accurate interpretation of data.
The research question to be addressed is ’to
critically compare normal browsing mode
artefacts recovered and analysed from Brave
Browser v88.1.20.110 and Google Chrome
v88.0.4323.190 on Windows 10 v20H2.’
This paper critically evaluates key similarities and differences when identifying, recovering and analysing web browser artefacts.
Brave Browser and Google Chrome are built
upon the same open source Chromium base.
However, little research exists as to the forensic implications presented when encountering
Brave on a suspect’s machine. Research aims
to establish if existing Chrome examination
tools and techniques can be extended to cover
Brave and what additional challenges this
presents to the practitioner. An experimentation and analysis methodology has been
Page 2

developed to establish what artefacts are left
behind, paying particular attention to recoverability, and to determine if interpretation of
their respective data structures is plausible,
for evidential value. The results and findings
provide the factual foundations for discussion
to determine how both browsers compare and
if a best practice approach is required.
To answer the research question, the
methodology has been designed to implement
the following objectives:
• Identify what artefacts are left behind
by Brave Browser v88.1.20.110, and if
they can be recovered?
• Identify what artefacts are left behind by
Google Chrome Browser v88.0.4323.190,
and if they can be recovered?
The essential criteria for establishing if objective 1 and 2 are met, involve the successful
identification, recovery of live, and recovery
of deleted artefacts from the following user
activities:
• Bookmarks
• Cached images and files
• Cookies
• Browsing, Media and Search History
• File Download History
Results and findings from the first two objectives provide the criteria to assess and
critically compare objectives three and four.
The remainder of this paper is structured
as follows. Section 2 presents background
and related work, followed by experiment and
analysis methodology in section 3. Results
and findings based upon the experimentation
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 outlines
a discussion reviewing research conducted in
previous sections. Section 6 discusses future
work before concluding with a summary in
Section 7.
© 2022 JDFSL
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2.

BACKGROUND AND
RELATED WORK

This section describes related work conducted
in the areas of Google Chrome and Brave
Browser Internet forensics.

2.1

Internet Forensics

Internet browser forensics is a branch of Digital Forensics responsible for uncovering evidence that may assist or undermine civil and
criminal cases. Research conducted in 2020
showed that out of a total population of 7.79
billion people, 4.57 billion people were Internet users. The number of global Internet
users increased by 346 million in 2020 alone.
(Kemp, 2020).
When investigating cyber-enabled and
cyber-dependent crimes, including fraud,
child sexual offences, and computer hacking,
browsing activity can provide a rich source
of potential evidence. (Crown Prosecution
Service, 2019). Almost every action carried
out by a user leaves behind artefacts that
may be recovered for analysis.
One example where Internet forensics assisted in the investigation and prosecution of
a person found to have committed tax fraud,
by cheating the public revenue was in the case
of R v Shareef. Forensic analysis of Shareef’s
devices found that he had created false invoices, bank statements, and VAT summaries,
accessed and modified through a web browser.
Shareef was sentenced in total to 11 and a
half years for making fraudulent VAT repayment claims over a six-year period. (HMRC,
2016)
Google Chrome (63.54%), Safari (19.45%),
Mozilla Firefox (3.64%) and Microsoft Edge
(3.23%) were found to be the four leading web
browsers by market share as of January 2021.
(StatCounter 2021a). There is a wealth of
related work into recovering forensic artifacts
from the top four web browsers. Bencherchali
© 2022 JDFSL

(2019) describes some of the common artefacts stored by browsers including bookmarks,
browser session, cache, history and file downloads. Many of the artefacts are stored on
disk inside specific location paths within the
operating system. Data is normally stored in
structured files, including SQLite databases,
ESE databases and JSON files, a shared characteristic between the browsers. It is not
unusual for a web browser such as Google
Chrome to use several file types for storing
different artefacts. For example, user history is stored in a SQLite database whilst
Bookmarks are stored within a JSON file.
Through structural analysis of these files, the
user activity can be reconstructed.
When conducting a forensic examination
of a web browser, it is not appropriate to only
analyse one file, as evidence is often split over
many separate but linked files. (Jadhav &
Meshram, 2018). This fragmentation of evidence, coupled with the fast pace of browser
innovation often causes the identification and
analysis of artefacts to become outdated.
In addition to the four leading web
browsers, there has been a rapid increase in
the release of alternative browsers, with user
privacy at their core. Since the 2013 unauthorised leaks of classified data by NSA contractor Edward Snowden, public awareness
of how online data is collected and used by
third parties has received increased scrutiny.
(Daniel, 2018).

2.2

Google Chrome Overview

Google Chrome is a cross-platform web
browser released in 2008. As of January 2021,
it accounts for the largest browser market
share of 63.54% (StatCounter 2021a). As of
writing this paper, the latest version is 88.
Due to its popularity among users, it also
attracts attention from the digital forensic
community to better understand evidential
opportunities and challenges posed when enPage 3
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countering Chrome in an investigation. The
identification of artefacts and their respective locations are well documented in prior
research.
A practitioner conducting an examination
will encounter an extensive range of artefacts,
including bookmarks, cache, cookies, current
tabs, history, sync transfers, and last session
data. (Malviya, 2020). The research provides
path listings of where each artefact is stored
on the Windows operating system and tools
for performing browser forensics. Shafqat
(2016) describes how the history file alone
was sufficient to reconstruct a timeline of the
user’s activity. Enough to establish intention.

ous upwards growth in demand, potentially
impacting digital investigations.
Reed et al. (2017) describes how serious
organised crime, alongside individual users
are benefitting from privacy driven browsers
such as Tor and Epic Privacy browsers to conduct money laundering, distribution of drugs
and to trade in indecent images of children.
This view is further supported by Mahlous
& Mahlous (2020), who conducted a study
of privacy preservation in the Brave browser
to suggest that criminals have gained more
awareness of private browsing functionality,
using them to cover their tracks when conducting criminality.

2.4
2.3

Brave Browser Overview

User privacy awareness is a key contributing factor for the development of the free
and open-source Brave Browser. Brave was
founded by Brendan Eich who was a cofounder of the Mozilla project, and Brian
Bondy who previously worked on Mozilla’s
Firefox browser. Brave’s design philosophy
is based on providing privacy-by-default adblocking, script blocking and anti-website
tracker capabilities, whilst rewarding users
through a crypto opt-in reward scheme. (Wilson, 2018).
Brave is developed upon the open-source
Chromium browser project which promotes
faster, safer browsing. As the project is open
source, Brave is able to make use of the code
for their own product, adding additional features on top. This is also the same base that
Google Chrome bases its browser on. (Keizer,
2020)
Statistics compared from 2020 to 2021
show the monthly active users increased from
11.6 to 25.4 million. (Brave Blog, 2021).
While this number is still only a fraction of
the 63.54% browser market share that Google
Chrome commands, it highlights a continuPage 4

Overview of Brave Browser
Forensics Research

Brave browser forensics is still in its early
infancy with little related work identified.
Benson (2016) noted the structure of recovered artefacts was very similar to Chrome
which is not surprising considering the shared
Chromium foundation. A number of Local
Storage, IndexedDB and database folders
were present however there was also a number
of files missing, notably the History SQLite
database. Differences between Brave and
Chrome included additional partition folders
which contained their own cookies, cache and
local storage.
As previously outlined, Brave adopting the
Chromium base often provides less features
than found in Chrome. In Brave version
0.8, the Cookie values were found to not
be encrypted but were however in Chrome.
(Benson, 2016). This can possibly be explained by the maturity of Chrome versus
newer browsers which encounter slower adoption of features, and differences in design
implementation, notably seen around privacy
functionality.
A recent study published by Mahlous &
Mahlous (2020) focused on privacy preserva© 2022 JDFSL

JDFSL 2022
tion in Brave browser on Windows 10. The
aim of the study was to examine which artefacts and where on the system they could
be recovered when using the private browsing mode. The study identified that artefacts only existed when conducting live RAM
analysis and dead box forensics from the
disk produced no evidence. The RAM extracted artefact results were similar to those
from Chrome, Epic, Browzer and Commodo
Dragon, sharing almost identical locations.
To compare artefacts recovered from private
mode browsing, an identical experiment was
conducted using the normal browsing mode.
The results of the normal browsing mode
provided a number of on-disk files and directory locations for browsing data but did not
elaborate further.
Magnet Forensics identified a limitation
that Chromium based browsers with similar
backend design can cause an issue for recovery
of carved records as it can be difficult to
determine from which browser the data came
from. (Magnet, 2017). This is especially true
if both browsers are installed on the same
suspect system. Even if only one browser
is found installed, there is an increased risk
that artefacts may be misinterpreted by both
forensic software tools and practitioners if
not identified and examined correctly.

3.

METHODOLOGY

This section describes the experiment and
analysis design considerations for the resources required to conduct the study.

3.1

Experiment Strategy

To conduct experiments to answer the research question and objectives, as outlined in
section 2, hardware and software are required.
The primary tools include a laptop capable
of running multiple virtual machines, Windows 10 operating system and virtualisation
software.
© 2022 JDFSL

Research was conducted using a forensically wiped Dell XPS laptop with a clean
copy of the Windows 10 v20H2 operating system and the latest security patches installed.
Windows 10 was installed from the University’s Azure Student Portal. Window 10 was
chosen as the base OS as it commands 76.26%
of the desktop operating system worldwide
market share, as of January 2021. This is
compared to 16.91% for Apple OS X and
1.91% for Linux distributions. (StatCounter,
2021b) Both web browsers are also fully supported on Windows 10.
VMWare Workstation Pro 15 supports
the running of multiple virtual machines
in parallel, isolating each from one another and the underlying physical host system. Windows 10 was installed onto a
clean Virtual Machine (VM) with a virtual 20GB hard drive and 8GB of RAM.
One user account named ’research_machine’
was created. After Windows was installed,
a registry snapshot was captured and VM
cloned; the original machine was kept to
provide a baseline for experiments, identified by reference VM_Base_Image. Google
Chrome v88.0.4323.190 was next installed
onto a copy of the cloned machine to provide the second experimental VM, referenced
as VM_Chrome, followed by a third clone
containing the Brave Browser installation
(v88.1.20.110), with reference VM_Brave.
The hard drive was kept at 20GB to satisfy the OS installation requirements, whilst
decreasing the time required to run data carving and keyword search term analysis.
The use of multiple cloned virtual machines is important when critically comparing
Brave against Chrome, as research from Magnet Forensics suggests the use of more than
one Chromium browser on a target system
can cause confusion when trying to recover
deleted artefacts. As the same dataset is used
for both browsers, this will limit misinterprePage 5
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tation during analysis. (Magnet Forensics,
2017)
Figure 1 provides an overview of the experiment methodology. Virtual machine snapshots at key interactions with the operating
system and web browser, creates a differencing virtual disk, where all changes are written
to that differencing disk from that point in
time. (Bose, 2018). Virtualised snapshots
provide a forensically sound method for limiting variables and user activity at each experiment stage, integral to identifying artefact
changes. Highlighting if an operating system
or user action caused a change to an artefact ensures accurate findings when critically
comparing each browser. Refer to Appendix
A – Table A1 for a descriptive breakdown of
each VM snapshot. During the experiment
and analysis phases of the research, contemporaneous notes using Microsoft OneNote
recorded the date and time that each action
was taken. This includes all user interactions
with each web browser and use of analytical
tools outlined in this section.
Experiments are designed to mimic typical user interaction with a browser using
the normal browsing mode to establish the
artifacts left behind. User activity is populated through the use of typed searches, navigation of website URLs and file downloads.
Search terms include unusual strings to facilitate keyword searching during analysis, limiting false positives. To facilitate file downloads, two images were randomly selected
and downloaded from the landing pages of
amazon.com and fetch.co.uk. A third image was selected from Google Images using
the search term ’Flags’ and saved to disk.
To create web streaming data, the search
term ’cats’ was searched on youtube.com,
with the video entitled ‘CATS will make you
LAUGH YOUR HEAD OFF - Funny CAT
compilation’ watched for 10 seconds. During
selected deletion of data, the file download
Page 6

history entry for DogLeft.png, downloaded
from fetch.co.uk was deleted from within each
browser.
The process for populating then deleting
selective user activity is provided in Table 1.

3.2

User Browsing Activity

Interaction with the browser occurred over
the space of 1 hour, primarily to limit date
and time stamps, useful when conducting low
level binary analysis, and searching across the
virtual disk.

3.3

Analysis Strategy and Tools

Third party forensic software tools are required to fulfil the needs of the analysis strategy, firstly to locate each artefact on-disk,
followed by the recovery, interpretation and
attribution. Tools in this section are installed
on the physical host machine to avoid contaminating the experiment virtual machine
environments.
Analysis of each experiment for each artefact, from each browser is conducted independently to allow the findings to be assessed in
Section 4. Figure 2 provides an overview of
how each artefact is analysed.
Each VM snapshot taken during experimentation is stored as separate VMDK container files.
AccessData FTK Imager V4.1.1.1 (AccessData, 2017) was chosen as it supports the
mounting of such containers. FTK Imager
also provides a directory tree viewer to navigate the disk image, forensically hash items of
interest, and export live files for further analysis in secondary tools. The most suitable
software tools for artefact analysis depend on
the file format. Selected tools required for
this research are:
• X-Ways WinHex v20.1
– For low level binary analysis
– For keyword searching
© 2022 JDFSL
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Figure 1. Experiment Process Model
– RegistryChangeView v1.27
– ESEDatabaseView v1.65
– WinPrefetchView v1.36
– ChromeCacheView v2.25
– ChromeCookieView v1.85

Figure 2. Analysis Process Model
– For data carving - recovery of
deleted records
– For reconstruction of artefacts
• DB Browser for SQLite v3.12.1 for Windows
– For running SQL queries which
provides an indication of deleted
records through missing row ID.
• Nirsoft tools:
© 2022 JDFSL

WinHex’s core functionality supports simultaneous searching across multiple character sets and carving at binary level, across
a range of file formats including those frequently encountered from Internet browsing
activity. Files typically requiring examination from a browser include SQLite binary
databases, Extensible Storage Engine (ESE)
databases and JSON files, which are fully
supported by this tool.
For artefacts such as History, an SQL
viewer is required to read the database format. DB Browser supports executing search
queries, and exporting of returned results. Areas of interest are database and table schemas
which, when interpreted may indicate what
type of data is stored, how that data might
be split across multiple tables, and most importantly, the data structures of individual
records within those tables.
Nirsoft tools developed by Nir Sofer provide analysis capability for specific browser
features including Cache and Cookies. RegistryChangeView is selected to capture and review changes to the Windows Registry, prior
Page 7
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Table 1. Experimental Activity
Tab

1

URLs Visited
www.bbc.co.uk Click on BBC News

www.just-eat.co.uk
www.game.co.uk

2

3
4

www.monzo.com
- add bookmark
www.hsbc.com
–add bookmark

Browsing Data Deletion

File Downloads
Searches
www.amazon.com
Brave, JPG - filename: Mday21_Desktop_Cat_Card_2_379x304._SY304_CB660441972_.jpg.
Chrome, JPG - filename: XCM_CUTTLE_1311643_1599235_UK_3697498_379x304_en_GB._SY304_CB658598983_.jpg
www.fetch.co.uk/ - PNG filename: DogLeft.png
www.images.google.com/ - JPG filename:
gn0547-flags-of-the-world.jpg
www.youtube.com - Search ‘cats’ and watch 10
seconds of video titled: ‘CATS will make you
LAUGH YOUR HEAD OFF - Funny CAT
compilation’
www.wikipedia.org - Search ‘education’ and click
the first link
www.bbc.co.uk/weather - Search ’London’
www.google.co.uk - Search: ‘santander’,
‘A1S2D3F4G5’ and ‘Z9X8C7V6B5’
Address bar search (Google) - ‘hexagon’,
‘pentagon’ and ‘rhombus’
Close tab 2 followed by closing tab 3
Delete Bookmark: www.monzo.com
Delete Browsing and Search History
o just-eat.co.uk
o Education - Wikipedia search
o Search term ‘A1S2D3F4G5’
o Search term ‘pentagon’
o ‘cats - YouTube’
Delete fetch downloaded image from list

to and after browser installation. ChromeCookieView offers decryption of the encrypted cookie value, added into Chromium
since v80 onwards. All results produced by
third party tools are dual verified using manual techniques in WinHex where appropriate.

typical user actions were performed to cause
artefact interaction. Once experiments were
completed, the analysis strategy was implemented, with each artefact analysed independently.

4.1

4.

RESULTS &
FINDINGS

This section outlines the experiments conducted for each browsing artefact and their
respective results. Results for each browser
are grouped under each artefact for comparison. Using the base image to produce a
clone for Brave, and a second for Google
Chrome, several experiments were conducted
to identify how artefacts compare between
each browser. During the user browsing activity as outlined in section 3.2, a series of
Page 8

Windows Registry

The first experiment required the use of Nirsoft RegistryChangesView v1.27 to review
system changes of the base VM registry prior
to browser installation and subsequent snapshot taken directly after browser installation. RegistryChangeView generates an Excel spreadsheet, detailing new files and folders added as registry keys and values. This
exercise was completed separately for both
browsers, to avoid misinterpretation of results. Analysis of the registry is used to identify the software installation process, and
initial setup behaviours which provided the
© 2022 JDFSL
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version identifier, and paths to the installation directories.
A keyword search of ‘Google’ on the
Registry Key column produced 358 hits
in the Software hive. A further filter applied to column ’Value Data’ for ’Google’
narrowed down hits to 103 entries. The
registry stores keys and values identifying
the Chrome version installed: 88.0.4324.190
and installation path of the executable
file, found at ‘C:\Program Files\Google\
Chrome\Application\chrome.exe’.
For Brave, the same ’Google’ keyword
search on the same Registry Key column produced slightly more hits at 367. The second
applied filter produced a smaller return of 84
hits. Both version and publisher identifiers,
alongside installation paths, observed with
Chrome, are provided. Brave version identified as 88.1.20.110 with program data found
at
‘C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\
Brave-Browser\Application\brave.exe’.

4.2

Browser Application
Structure

Examination of the registry provided
the default installation location of the
application system files, for Brave found
at
C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\
Brave-Browser\Application\ and for
Chrome found at C:\Program Files\
Google\Chrome\Application\.
The VM user account ’research_machine’
was found to store locally generated
artefacts
at
C:\Users\[username]
\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\
Brave-Browser\User Data\ for Brave
and
C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\
for
Chrome. A sub-directory entitled ‘Default’
contains the majority of artefacts of interest
including Bookmarks, Cache, Cookies,
History and Session data. Appendix A © 2022 JDFSL

Figure A1 provides a side by side comparison
of the similar looking structure.
Comparison proves that both browsers implement a similar directory and file structure,
with identical naming conventions. Further
analysis of the VM snapshots highlighted that
additional directories and artefact files are
created upon opening the browser and starting the browsing activity. Observation saw
bookmarks, and last sessions and tabs, only
created on disk for that particular user when
that feature was initiated.

4.3

Browsing History

The History SQLite database is responsible
for the storage of typed search terms and inputted web URLs in the browser address bar,
and search engines. The database does not
contain a file extension but upon binary examination, a SQLite header is present. SQLite
is implemented using B-Trees which provides
a self-balancing mechanism that maintains
data storage, searching, new insertions and
deletions. Separate B-Trees are used for each
table and index in the SQLite database.
To meet objectives one and two of
this research, the artefact must be identified, and data recovered. The location
of the History browsing database for
Brave, and Chrome is respectively found
at
‘C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\
and
User Data\Default\History’
‘C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\
Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\
History’.
An associated file named
History.journal is also present but was
found empty during binary analysis.
Opening History in DB Browser for
SQLite identified 12 tables and 11 indexes.
Table structure including column names and
data types were identical for both browsers.
The test data was compared to the active
records by producing an SQL query that
Page 9
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linked tables: urls and visits. Live records
show 47 entries in Chrome and 60 entries in
Brave. To filter for unique records related
to the transition value, the SQL query was
updated as shown in Appendix A (2021) Figure A2. This resulted in 19 records in
Chrome and 22 in Brave. The difference being Chrome lacked some entries when entered
website URLs were redirected to HTTPS. All
expected test data that was not deleted during the experimentation process is present.
Both browsers reported 7 deleted rows in
table: urls.
Manual validation of the findings was conducted using binary SQLite analysis of the
History database. Deconstruction of the
SQLite file header showed that Write Ahead
Logs (WAL) was not set, auto-vacuum off
and no free pages detected. The header, leaf
table and record payload were successfully
deconstructed. This process involved interpreting multi-VARINT values to identify each
record’s length and corresponding values. An
example is highlighted in Appendix A (2021)
– Figure A3 and Table A2. The records displayed by DB Browser for SQLite matched
the raw binary structure.
Text and hexadecimal keyword searching
within the History database using WinHex
failed to identify any deleted browsing activity. Related work suggested that partial fragments from deleted records may be present;
however it was observed that where deleted
records may be expected that those sections
were zeroed out. A manual review of the
binary also failed to identify deleted data.
Review of VM snapshot 6 showed the same
area of binary zeroed out. This infers that
closing the browser session did not impact
when data was deleted but rather was caused
by a time based, application or operating
system feature driven process.
Hex & ASCII keyword terms for deleted
test data:
Page 10

• 41315332443346344735
(A1S2D3F4G5)
• 70656e7461676f6e (Pentagon)
• 6a7573742d6561742e636f2e756b
(just-eat.co.uk)
• 456475636174696f6e (Education)
• 63617473202d20596f7554756265
(cats - YouTube)
Keyword searching was extended to search
the full OS partition, for both browsers. Only
the two typed search terms ’‘A1S2D3F4G5’
and ‘Pentagon’ for Chrome using the Google
search engine were partially identifiable,
found in Chrome artefacts: Session Storage
log named 000003.log, Local Storage LevelDB log named 000004.log and Windows
Storage DataSharing ESE database named
DSSres00001.jrs.
On inspection of the artefacts, most hits
only referenced the searched term; however,
the file named DSSres00001.jrs contained the
full Google search URL that pointed to the
web page when accessed. The hits could not
be forensically attributed back to the History
database. The same keyword searching for
Brave produced hits in free space and pagefile.sys. All deleted records from the url table
were successfully located, deconstructed, and
carved, providing of interest, the original row
ID, url and timestamps. As all deleted entries were present, a SQL file header search
was conducted but failed to identify the full
database for carving.

4.4

History Provider Cache

An additional source for history data is the
History Provider Cache, structured as Google
Protocol Buffers. The file contains only visits
and predates information found in the main
History database. Deleted history search
terms in both ASCII and their hexadecimal
equivalent where not found.
© 2022 JDFSL
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4.5

File Download History

Metadata relating to the files downloaded
through the browser are stored in the same
History SQLite database as browsing history. The analysis process outlined in Section
4.3 was repeated for file downloads, first to
confirm the presence of data, identify if any
records were deleted, and attempt to recover
using browser and wider OS artefacts.
As discussed in Section 3.2, three images
were downloaded during the data population
process before the file download history entry
for file named DogLeft.png was deleted.
An experiment was constructed using SQL
queries to join tables: downloads and
downloads_url_chains from the History
database. Two records with row ID 1 and
3 were found to be present. Row ID 1
corresponded to the image downloaded from
Amazon.co.uk, and row ID 3 corresponded
to the image of flags downloaded from Google
Images. Data present in the row included
the
GUID, current file path, start
time of download, received bytes,
total bytes, end time of download,
accessed status, last accessed time,
URL site referrer and last modified
timestamp. Row 2 was not present and
presumed deleted, in line with observed
browsing table behaviour.
Binary SQLite analysis verified that
DB Browser had accuracy interpreted the
database. This was followed by inspection of
the column named current_path which indicated that downloads by default are saved
to the user’s Download folder. Review of
the Downloads folder found an image named
‘DogLeft.png’. The file’s timestamps showed
that it was downloaded within one minute of
the two other graphics present in the folder,
matching the experiment user activity. A keyword search in ASCII and hexadecimal failed
to return any hits from the History database.
Wider OS artefacts were reviewed to aid in
© 2022 JDFSL

the recovery of missing row ID 2, assumed to
be the metadata relating to DogLeft.png.
4.5.1

Chrome

A full disk keyword search for the text
and hex term ’DogLeft’ produced multiple hits in free space, pagefile.sys and
ntuser.dat. Unfortunately, the hits related
to the actual image file and not to the
corresponding database record. Hits in
the Chrome log named 00003.log, part
of shared_proto_db found the GUID,
URL, referrer URL, downloaded last
modified timestamp, mime type and
download path. This binary data was found
to be positioned between the binary of the
other two downloaded files. Additional
hexadecimal searching of converted timestamps failed to provide remaining metadata
expected in a file download record row.
The final 3 hits successfully recovered the
complete database record from SRUDB.dat,
an ESE database, located at C:\Windows\
System32\sru. Windows System Resource
Usage Monitor (SRUM) contains information about machine activity, by monitoring
desktop application programs, services, and
network connections. Like the data found in
shared_proto_db, the deleted record was positioned between the two existing live records.
Appendix A (2021) – Figure A5 shows the
recovered database record. This experiment
highlights that analysis of browser only artefacts is not always sufficient as in this example, the missing database row was identified
from analysis of a wider OS artefact.
4.5.2

Brave

Conducting the same examination for
Brave, a similar number of hits containing
metadata relating to the DogLeft.png file
were found in free space. The database
record could not be recovered however,
similar data to that extracted from the
Chrome log in the shared_proto_db
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directory, was discovered in a log also
named 00003.log but was instead located
in the C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\
User Data\Default directory, providing
GUID and URL referrer metadata.
The
SRUDB.dat ESE database in the Brave VM
did not contain the missing row ID entry.

4.6

Windows OS Artefacts

To complement browser artefacts, a number
of Windows OS artefacts were investigated,
guided by search term hits. OS artefacts
recovered included Alternative Data Streams
(ADS) attached to the downloaded graphic
files, Windows Desktop Search and Windows
Prefetch.
ADS provided the host URL, which enhanced the examination as this piece of metadata is not stored in the History database,
and useful for additional searching. The
ZoneID with value 3 showed that the graphic
files were downloaded from the Internet using
a web browser.
The NirSoft ESEDatabaseView tool
facilitated the parsing of Windows Desktop
Search (WDS), an ESE database, found
at
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search\
Data\Applications\Windows\, providing
a wealth of graphic metadata including
modified, accessed and created timestamps,
file size, colour profiles and paths. This
artefact is useful for demonstrating user
activity conducted around the same time.
During experimentation, each graphic was
opened after download through the browser.
Prefetch, a Windows artefact, found at C:is
responsible for the loading of resources before
they are required to decrease the time waiting. Using a second NirSoft tool named WinPrefetechView, it was shown that the three
images including ’DogLeft.png’, downloaded
from the fetch.co.uk website were accessed
within 1 minute of one another.
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The linked association between browser
artefacts and Windows OS artefacts can be
seen in Figure 3. A corresponding table explaining relationships between each node can
be found in Figure 4.

Figure 3. Artefact Association Diagram

4.7

Cache

Browser Cache is a temporary storage
method for static assets such as webpages and
images that do not typically change, used to
reduce bandwidth and load commonly visited
sites faster. Forensic analysis of Cache provided a great wealth of recoverable live and
deleted data. Both browsers were found to
have implemented the same structure, with
data blocks starting with the string ‘Data’
and data files starting with the letter ‘F’,
each followed by an incremental hex counter.
Chrome stores Cache at C:\Users\
[username] \AppData\Local\Google\
Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache, whilst
Brave Cache at: C:\Users\[username]
\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\
Brave-Browser\User Data\Default\
Cache.
NirSoft ChromeCacheView v2.25, parsed
and recovered all live and deleted records,
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Figure 4. Artefact Diagram Relationships
displaying additional fields such as server
IP, a value not populated in the History
database. The reported metadata matches
other collaborating artefacts including the recovered record from SRUDB.dat. Manual verification of the tool was conducted with WinHex and found no data inaccuracies. ChromeCacheView also encountered no issues in parsing Brave’s Cache.
Extraction and reconstruction of the data
files lets the practitioner review the cached
copy of the webpage. Appendix A – Figure
A5 provides an example of the deleted justeat.co.uk browsing record.

4.8
Brave and
store user

Bookmarks
Chrome were
bookmarks in

© 2022 JDFSL

found to
a JSON

file.
Chrome bookmarks are stored
at
C:\Users\[username] \AppData\
Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\
Default\Bookmarks whilst Brave stores
at
C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\
User Data\Default\Bookmarks.
Two bookmarks were added during the
experiments, related to banking websites
hsbc.com and monzo.com. The monzo.com
bookmark was deleted. Analysis of the
JSON file in Sublime Text 3 provided
only the live hsbc.com bookmark, containing its name, URL, bookmark folder,
date added and timestamps, including a
synced timestamp.
Keyword searching to aid in identifying
the deleted bookmark using the structure
of the existing JSON bookmark failed to
produce hits on the disk image for either
browser. Closer inspection of Brave, identified two temporary and marked as deleted
by WinHex, bookmark files. One empty
(Bookmarks∼FR1122b8.TMP) but the second named Bookmarks RF15dd79.TMP containing the deleted Monzo bookmark.

4.9

Cookies

Cookies are files created by websites
visited as part of normal user browsing.
Both browsers store cookies in an identically structured SQLite database, located
for Chrome at C:\Users\[username]
\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\
User Data\Default\Cookies
and
for
Brave at C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\
User Data\Default\Cookies. Review of
the database using DB Browser identified 182
cookies present in table: cookies for Chrome
and 87 cookies for Brave. An SQL query
filtering for records related to ‘bbc.co.uk’
found 10 hits returned for Chrome but only
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5 for Brave. Appendix A – Figure A6 shows
the SQL query.
Cookie values are encrypted since
Chromium version 80 onwards.
These
are stored in the table: cookies, column:
‘encrypted_value’. Nirsoft ChromeCookieView v1.85 is the tool of choice to decrypt
cookie values.
The decryption process
requires the user login password, Local
State file and Protect Folder found at
C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\
Microsoft\Protect from each browser.
ChromeCookieView was successful in decryption for both browsers. WinHex binary
deconstruction of a sample bbc.co.uk record
was conducted to confirm tool accuracy.

4.10

Media History

One Youtube video was briefly played
as part of the experiment.
This activity was discovered in the Media
History SQLite database, located for
at
C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\
Default\Media History
for
Chrome
and
C:\Users\[username]\AppData\
Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\
for
User Data\Default\Media History
Brave. The video was played for 15 seconds
during Chrome experimentation and for
19 seconds in Brave. Both values were
successfully recovered. Appendix A (2021) –
Figure A7 provides the SQL query used to
extract the record.
The database interestingly records if the
media has audio and video, title and
artist of the media item, and a URL that
links to the static video image, in the case
of the YouTube video. This is of forensic
importance as it assists the practitioner to
demonstrate that the user had an awareness
of the video content before clicking through
to start said item, followed by the duration
of the video played.
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4.11

Brave Attention Tokens
(BAT)

Analysis of the core browsing artefacts
showed little to no difference between Brave
and Chrome. Upon further inspection of
Brave, a directory named ads_service
was found in the ..\User Sata\Default
folder. There contained a SQLite database
named database.sqlite and four JSON
files
named
‘ad_conversions.json’,
‘client.json’, ‘confirmations.json’, and
‘notifications.json’.
According to Brave (2021), their Basic Attention Token (BAT) is a way of rewarding users who spend time visiting content
creators and advertisers, signed up to the
scheme. The browser automatically starts
tallying up the time spent on each site visited.
Brave adds that this tally is only stored on
the device’s local disk. Analysis showed that
the artefact was turned on by default, with
the ad_service directory appearing during
browsing activity between VM snapshot 2
and 3.
During the course of populating user
browsing activity in the browser, 3 adverts are found in the ad_events SQLite
table. Two of type ‘ad_notifications’
and one ‘new_tab_page_ad’ were recorded.
Linking database.sqlite data against
confirmations.json, it was possible to
determine that the current payments balance for month: 2021-03 was 0.0, however this value only updates by one decimal place. The true balance was 0.07, with
three ads being recorded as viewed in the
JSON transaction_history tag. Appendix
A (2021)– Figure A8 shows the transaction
balance.
Forensically, this provides a new artefact to
identify time spent interacting with a browser,
and possible cryptocurrency links. The evidential value cannot be overlooked so was
added to research scope.
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5.

DISCUSSION

The first two objectives of the research question are to establish if Brave Browser and
Google Chrome artefacts could be successfully identified and recovered when a user
operates in normal browsing mode on a Windows 10 machine. Experiments were devised to supply sufficient user browsing data
to populate core artefacts; Cache, Cookies,
Browsing, Media and Search History, and
File Download History.
It was observed that Brave Browser and
Google Chrome stores user generated artefacts from normal browsing mode on disk,
that remains persistent, even after closure of
the browser session and shutdown of Windows 10. Implementing a combination of
third party parser and visualisation tools,
with manual binary level verification ensured
accuracy of interpreted results.
The history file provides sufficient information to reconstruct a user’s browsing activity, from typed URLs and search engine
keywords to downloaded files. This can be
complemented with cached data which provides locally saved copies of websites that
the user has visited. For the forensic practitioner, these two artefacts combined show
that the device had conducted the activity
in question.
Browser artefacts, located in the user’s
local AppData folder structure, have been
recovered from the experiments including
typed URLs, keyword searches and graphics.
URLs and keywords were primarily found in
the History SQLite database, alongside file
downloads, whilst graphics were abundant in
Cache. Cache plays an important role when
identifying and recovering deleted data. Often in forensic investigation, the examination
strategy will focus on an initial starting point,
which may surface from a search term hit or
time frame of interest, to determine what
artefacts should be examined first. Analy© 2022 JDFSL

sis from both browsers showed that Cache
provides the opportunity to reconstruct websites and review graphics. However, they are
stored in data blocks without file extensions
so the data files must first be interpreted to
identify pointers.
Related work indicated that deleted data
may be stored within browser artefact data
structures however analysis indicated that
this was not the case for SQLite databases
using the legacy write format, and for JSON
files. When records are deleted, the SQLite
B-Tree structure is modified so records are
moved from node to node. The forensic implication is once data is marked for deletion, the tree must be rebalanced, allowing for elements to be moved among nodes,
or whole nodes to be rearranged within the
database. Nodes contain unallocated space
which may contain deleted or modified data
however, analysis failed to identify or recover
any of the deleted search terms from the History database. Binary located between table
records, identified as potentially once containing the now deleted data, were zeroed
out.
Even with the lack of recoverable data
from the browser artefacts internal structures,
wider operating system artefacts were successful in either recovering the full deleted record,
attributed back to the browser database table,
or as a minimum provided partial references.
The forensic implication to this approach is
that the user activity test data was known
beforehand so search terms could be crafted
however in real life investigation, these would
not necessarily be known and could be difficult to identify without prior intelligence.
As is common practice in forensic investigation, artefacts should be collaborated to
build up a timeline of user and system activity, showing how one action caused a change
elsewhere. Using a downloaded graphics file
as the starting point (DogLeft.png), it was
Page 15

JDFSL 2022
possible to visually show how a combination
of browser and OS artefacts were related,
strengthening evidential value.
The artefacts selected to compare Brave
Browser critically and Google Chrome were
shown to be identical in location, internal
data structure and operation. Each artifact’s
internal configuration also appears identical,
observed through deleted database records
being zeroed out when the binary was examined.
Related work by Benson (2016) suggested
that Brave’s development was behind that of
Chrome so artefacts such as Cookies might
appear different however this was not found
to be the case. Findings confirm that both
browsers are now running Chromium version
80+. ChromeCacheView and ChromeCookieView accurately parsed and interpreted
Brave’s artefacts. Browser implementation
of Chromium version 80 onwards provides a
consistent examination approach, further supporting forensic practitioners and software
developers.
The key differences did not come from the
core artefacts but the additional of Brave specific features. Whilst out of initial research
scope, the incorporation of cryptocurrency
wallets and privacy advert system produced
artefacts not observed in Chrome.
The research provides forensic practitioners
and software developers with the confidence
that investigations involving the latest versions of Brave Browser and Google Chrome
at this time of writing, can be examined using the same tools and techniques, producing
the same findings for the core artefacts. The
ISO 17025 standard focuses on the competencies required for testing and calibration
laboratories. This research is not intended
to provide a method for use in an investigation, but rather to identify areas of interest in
the Brave Browser and determine how they
relate to those in Google Chrome. By folPage 16

lowing the research methodology, those technical staff responsible for implementation of
ISO 17025 accreditation can replicate and
reproduce findings to ensure a consistent approach when investigating browser artefacts
in a forensically sound manner. This research
and associated results can also be used by
laboratory staff to aid in creating tests or
validating software designed to extract data
relating to Brave Browser activity.

5.1

Limitations

Upon reflection of the chosen methodology,
user browsing test activity could be refined.
Each artifact could instead be populated and
individually snapshotted rather than populating data followed by snapshots at key moments. This would simplify analysis when
multiple search hits are found in multiple disk
locations, ensuring that the expected artefact
was indeed the one that generated the hits.
To avoid misinterpretation of results and
findings, each browser was installed in a
separate VM. In a real world investigation,
it would not be uncommon to encounter
multiple browsers on the same machine.
This would add complexity to analysis but
nonetheless represent real world findings.
Experimentation methodology specified
two periods of five-minute time intervals
where no user interaction with the browser
occurred. The first after user browsing, and
second, after deletion of browsing activity.
This may have had an impact on why some
deleted artefacts were found on disk, in locations including free space and pagefile.sys,
whilst others were not recoverable.
The original methodology contained the
artefact ’last sessions and tabs’ however, difficulties were encountered in the deconstruction of the Session Saver (SNSS) file format.
Whilst keyword terms were identified and content appeared consistent for both browsers,
the binary structure could not be parsed to
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an adequate standard, to be able to provide
factual results and findings. For this reason,
it was removed from artefact scope.

6.

FUTURE WORK

Experiments were conducted using virtual
machines rather than physical hardware to
provide a more realistic environment when
researching user activity behaviour. There
is a lack of research that looks at virtualization’s accuracy compared to physical
hardware when conducting digital forensic
research.
The research tested each browser in separation to simplify the process of identifying
and recovering artefacts. Further research
could investigate what, if any, forensic implications are present using multiple Chromium
browsers on the same system.
Another area of forensic interest would be
to compare Brave to other Chromium based
browsers, identifying key differences which
may pose forensic challenges.
Finally, further work is recommended to
identify forensic opportunities of how Brave
specific artefacts are linked and structured,
paying particular attention to the Brave Attention Token (BAT). BAT is a crypto asset
system that pays publishers for their content
and rewards users for their attention, by viewing targeted adverts. Brave’s incorporated
Binance widget makes it the only browser
currently on the market to integrate functionality for buying and trading cryptocurrency.
Examination showed the presence of an advert artefact, recording the adverts presented
to the user, frequency and balance of the
user’s crypto wallet.

7.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the literature review discovered a lack of Brave Browser research, with
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related work identifying differences in recoverable artefacts and their data structures. This
paper has shown that Brave Browser artefacts
are located and structured in an identical format to those recovered from Google Chrome.
The latest version of Brave did not reflect findings from related work, with artefact structures updated to the latest Chromium version, in keeping with Chrome. An experiment
and analysis methodology was conducted using best practice guidelines, ensuring that
the results were accurate and repeatable.
The majority of user activity was discovered in the History SQLite database, storing
typed URLs, search terms, and file download history. Whilst deleted records were
not recoverable from the History database,
Windows 10 system artefacts were shown to
store either full records attributed back to
the database, or partial fragments, still of evidential value. It was further discovered that
the browsers adopt many storage file formats
including SQLite, ESE and JSON files.
It was observed that more than one browser
artefact stores similar structured data which
can be harnessed during examination. Where
deleted browsing and search records could not
be recovered from History, Cache provided
the full history with website and graphic fragments, enough evidence to determine the order in which the experimental user activity
was conducted in.
Similarities between both browsers proved
unexpected, with identical location, file format, and binary deconstruction of data structures. Nirsoft tools developed for Chrome,
successfully parsed and accuracy interpreted
Brave artefacts, supporting this finding.
Key differences came in what data was populated in those files, namely Brave storing
considerably less Cookies, likely explained by
cross-site cookie blocking enabled by default.
Brave offers unparalleled privacy and security which was observed by a significantly
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lower number of cookies stored, 87 versus.
182 stored by Chrome. Whilst this has a negative evidential impact, the wealth of other
data stored in remaining artefacts such as
user timeline activity and reconstruction of
events, mitigates much of this loss. It was
also highlighted that Brave has additional
artefacts including Brave Attention Tokens
(BAT) which should be investigated further,
possibly providing further evidential value.
In summary, research findings assure that
Chromium based Brave Brower and Google
Chrome can be forensically examined using
the same tools and techniques for artefacts
shared between both, in normal browsing
mode including Cache, Cookies, Browsing,
Media and Search History, and File Download
History.
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Appendices
A.

SUPPORTING TABLES AND FIGURES
Table A1. Virtual Machine Snapshot Summary

Snapshot
Snapshot 1
Snapshot 2

Browser
Description
VM_Base_Image Windows 10 Installed
VM_Base_Image Installation of VMTools

Snapshot 3 Installation
Snapshot 4 Snapshot 5 Snapshot 6 Completed
Snapshot 7 -

Google Chrome

Snapshot 3 Installation
Snapshot 4 Snapshot 5 Snapshot 6 Completed
Snapshot 7 -

Brave Browser

Page 20

Google Chrome

Google Chrome Opened
Browser Activity
Browser Activity

Google Chrome
Google Chrome

Brower Closed

Google Chrome

Google Chrome

Install of Google Chrome web
browser
Chrome session opened
Completion of user browsing activity
Data population and deletion
completed

Brave Browser

Install of Brave Browser

Brave Browser Opened
Browser Activity
Browser Activity

Brave Browser
Brave Browser

Browser Closed

Brave Browser

Brave session opened
Completion of user browsing activity
Data population and deletion
completed

Brave Browser
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Table A2. Binary Deconstruction of History DB Record
Record

Type

Data Type

Data

Table Column
Field

Multi-VARINT
1000010000100001
0x84 0x21 0000001000100001
545-13=532
532/2=266

String

0x0D
0x09
0x08

String
Int
Int

https://consent.google.com/set?
continue=https://www.google.co.uk/?gws_rd%3Dssl
&origin=https://www.google.co.uk&v=GB.en-GB
%2BV9%2BBX%2B227&cc=1&if=1&gl=GB
url
&x=3&pc=s&t1=ADw3F8jqJKAJEdMXZRQ
KolkzhAlN4ygGA:1614686769330&t2=ADw3F8i
TvaPyG4TKWmRPpNIIlv4dUJrabg:1614686772021
title
1
visit_count
0
type_count

Int

13259160372688846

last_visit_time

Int

1

hidden

0x06
0x09

13-13=0
Integer constant 1
Integer constant 0
Big endian 64-bit
twos-complement
integer
Integer constant 1

Figure A1. Browser Directory Side by Side Comparison

© 2022 JDFSL

Page 21

JDFSL 2022

Figure A2. History DB SQL Query

Figure A3. History DB Record Binary
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Figure A4. Recovered File Download Database Record

Figure A5. Cached Local Website
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Figure A6. Brave Browser Cookies DB SQL Query

Figure A7. Brave Browser Media History SQL Query
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Figure A8. Brave Attention Token (BAT) Transaction Balance
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